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Despite the fact that Latin American countries have transitioned to democracy, many citizens residing in peripheral regions continue to live under undemocratic rule. Democrats and Autocrats studies the existence of subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) alongside national democratic regimes. Specifically it answers the following questions: Why do SURs continue to exist despite national democratization? Why do some subnational autocrats and SURs prevail despite presidents' strategies to weaken SURs? Why do democratic presidents support some autocrats and SURs, even when they are from the opposition? Under what conditions do democratically elected presidents endorse or combat (opposition and/or copartisan) autocrats and SURs?
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the book argues that there are multiple pathways for SURs reproduction within democratic countries. These pathways, in turn, are determined by a specific combination of intergovernmental interactions, all of which are shaped by institutional and economic national and subnational variables.
The explanation of SUR continuity advanced in this book is tested in contemporary Argentina and Mexico using a multi-method approach. Both quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as cross-national and within-country comparisons are employed to test pathways of SUR continuity in two of Latin America's largest countries.
Transformations in Governance is a major new academic book series from Oxford University Press. It is designed to accommodate the impressive growth of research in comparative politics, international relations, public policy, federalism, environmental and urban studies concerned with the dispersion of authority from central states up to supranational institutions, down to subnational governments, and side-ways to public-private networks. It brings together work that significantly advances our understanding of the organization, causes, and consequences of multilevel and complex governance. The series is selective, containing annually a small number of books of exceptionally high quality by leading and emerging scholars.
The series targets mainly single-authored or co-authored work, but it is pluralistic in terms of disciplinary specialization, research design, method, and geographical scope. Case studies as well as comparative studies, historical as well as contemporary studies, and studies with a national, regional, or international focus are all central to its aims. Authors use qualitative, quantitative, formal modeling, or mixed methods. A trade mark of the books is that they combine scholarly rigour with readable prose and an attractive production style.
The series is edited by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and the VU Amsterdam, and Walter Mattli of the University of Oxford.
- Sales Rank: #3067404 in Books
- Published on: 2015-04-12
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 6.30" h x .90" w x 9.30" l, 1.30 pounds
- Binding: Hardcover
- 272 pages
About the Author
Agustina Giraudy is an Assistant Professor at the School of International Service at American University. She is broadly interested in the unfolding of politics beyond the central state, including, subnational undemocratic regimes in democratic countries, subnational judicial institutions, and the territorial reach of the state. Her work has appeared or is forthcoming in the Journal of Politics, the Journal of Politics in Latin America, Studies in Comparative International Development , Latin American Research Review, Journal of Democracy (en Espanol), Revista de Ciencia Politica (Chile), among others. Her dissertation, from which her book originates, received the 2010 Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy awarded by the American Political Science Association.
Most helpful customer reviews
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful.
Theoretical shortcomings
By Michael Buehler
Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime
Continuity within Democratic Countries, by Agustina Giraudy. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015, 214 pp., $84.95 Hardcover.
Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy, by Rebecca
Weitz-Shapiro. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 195 pp., $90.00
Hardcover.
Reviewed by Michael Buehler
Department of Politics and International Studies, School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London
Research on subnational authoritarianism in democratic countries has gained momentum
over the past decade. Most existing studies aim at explaining why and how local strongmen
managed to survive in some but not other subnational jurisdictions despite a
democratization of politics at the national level. Focusing on subnational variance in
democratization as well as trying to understand regime continuity, existing studies rarely
consider the possibility that subnational authoritarian regimes may continue to exist for
different reasons. Available research also does not say much about what causes may lead to
the breakdown of subnational authoritarian regimes. Two new books address these gaps in
the current literature on subnational authoritarianism.
In Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity
within Democratic Countries, Augustina Giraudy examines the conditions that allow for the
continuity of Subnational Undemocratic Regimes (SURs), which are subnational political
entities in which incumbents prevent opposition candidates from gaining access to state
positions through undemocratic and informal actions, including electoral fraud and voter
intimidation, the restriction of civil and political rights, and frequent changes in the local
electoral and institutional framework. Giraudy argues that there are several ways in which
SURs may continue after countries adopt democratic institutions at the national level. The
interaction between national and local executive governments provides the key to
understanding this variance in SURs continuity. Concretely, in democracies in which
presidents can wield effective power over (co-partisan or opposition) subnational autocrats
and have enough leverage to force the latter to cooperate, presidents have incentives to
strengthen and sustain SURs as such local autocrats are useful allies in elections. This power
constellation results in SURs reproduction from above.
In contrast, there are subnational autocrats whom national presidents cannot co-opt
because they lack the powers to do so. Presidents have an incentive to undermine such
potentially unruly SURs. However, if such local autocrats have the capacity to maintain local
party elite unity and are supported by the local masses, SURs self-reproduction follows as
these autocrats successfully fend off presidential attacks from above. If presidential powers to
co-opt SURs are ineffective and local autocrats are incapable of putting together a solid local
coalition, SURs usually become democratic jurisdictions, Giraudy argues.
Understanding the interaction between national and local players is, therefore, key in
isolating the conditions for SURs survival. To this end, Giraudy examines the powers of
presidents to co-opt local autocrats as well as the power of local autocrats to maintain their
autonomy vis-a`-vis presidents.
A combination of fiscal and institutional powers determines the authority of presidents
over local autocrats. A president’s fiscal powers are high if intergovernmental transfers occur
at the discretion of the national executive government. A president’s fiscal powers are low if
transfers between government layers occur automatically and are based on predefined
formulas. Furthermore, presidents yield high fiscal powers if they can easily change the rules
for the allocation of fiscal resources. Finally, if national tax revenues from which subnational
political units are excluded are large, the president gains additional fiscal power.
A president enjoys commands over strong partisan powers if the party to which the
president belongs is highly institutionalized, enjoys high party discipline due to established
rules and regulations, and has a presence in every subnational jurisdiction. Under such
conditions, co-partisans ruling over undemocratic jurisdictions can be co-opted through the
party apparatus, while local autocrats affiliated with opposition parties can be threatened
through the potential mobilization of subnational party branches belonging to the
president’s party.
However, to fully understand the authority of presidents, the capacity of subnational
autocrats to fend off attacks also needs to be taken into account. Again, a combination of
fiscal and institutional powers determine subnational autocrats’ autonomy vis-a`-vis the
center. With regard to fiscal conditions, the size of local fiscal deficits, levels of indebtedness,
and the possibility to raise taxes at the subnational level define the fiscal autonomy of local
autocrats. If local fiscal deficits and indebtedness are high while possibilities to collect local
revenues are scarce, local autocrats have only weak fiscal powers to resist co-optation from
above. Institutional conditions that determine the degree to which presidents can co-opt
SURs fall into two broad categories, namely patrimonial and non-patrimonial state
structures. Patrimonial state structures exist if the local institutional framework centralizes
power in the hands of the local ruler, blurs the distinction between public and private
interests, generates dependencies that can be exploited for political gain, and facilitate the use
of public resources for private gain. Non-patrimonial local state structures, in contrast, limit
the power of incumbents, protect the autonomy of societal groups when interacting with the
state, and establish clear rules to distinguish public and private goods. Such institutional
differences are important as they determine the capacity of local autocrats to defend
themselves against outside attacks. Patrimonial structures increase the propensity of local
autocrats to neutralize presidential attacks, while non-patrimonial structures make it difficult
for local autocrats to control the boundaries to their jurisdictions and neutralize co-optation
attempts from above. In short, ‘‘a combination of national and subnational variables need to
be present in order for presidents to wield effective power over SURs/ autocrats,’’ so Giraudy
(p. 26).
This combination of national and subnational variables results in subnational autocrats
whom presidents can easily co-opt and others who are relatively more autonomous. Local
autocrats who enjoy comparatively high levels of autonomy vis-a`-vis national presidents pose
a potential threat to national leaders who, therefore, seek to oust them from power.
However, unruly local autocrats who manage to impose party discipline and elicit the
support of the masses will survive national efforts to undermine their rule.
To test her theory, Giraudy examines SURs continuity in Argentina and Mexico and finds
that the combination of fiscal and institutional conditions at the national and subnational
level has led to SURs reproduction from above as well as SURs self-reproduction in both
countries. However, Argentinian presidents enjoy greater fiscal powers than their Mexican
counterparts, while the Peronist Partido Justicialista in Argentina is weakly institutionalized
and party discipline is low. Mexico differs from Argentina as the Partido Accio'n Nacional
presidential party in power during the period examined in the book under review here was
comparatively more institutionalized. Therefore, fiscal conditions at the national and local
levels play more of a role in the continuity of SURs in Argentina, while partisan structures
are comparatively more consequential for SURs durability in Mexico.
The main findings presented in Giraudy’s book, namely that there are different pathways
to SURs continuity both between and within countries and that these pathways are
determined by the capacity of presidents to co-opt local autocrats, challenge existing research
on subnational authoritarianism in several ways.
Giraudy contributes to and expands existing works that place institutions and
intergovernmental relations at the center of their analysis by challenging previous research
that locate the causes for SURs continuity at the subnational level, such as Edward Gibson’s
argument in ‘‘Boundary control’’ which says that local autocrats prevail if they manage to
close the boundary to their authoritarian jurisdiction by preventing opposition forces access
to outside allies and resources.1 Giraudy’s research suggests that SURs continuity is possible
even if local autocrats fail to close boundaries to their jurisdictions because presidents may
lack the powers to take advantage of such openings. There may, therefore, be different
reasons within the same country for why SURs survive, a possibility that previous studies
such as Gibson’s do not consider.
However, Giraudy argument is mainly aimed against scholars who see subnational
authoritarianism as a product of local conditions. Following Edward Gibson’s institutioncentric
theory of subnational authoritarianism, she argues that SURs are decisively nonlocal
in origins and the result of complex processes between different institutional layers. Giraudy
takes issue with claims made in previous research that ‘‘SUR continuity is determined by
geographic location, cultural heritage, and levels of socioeconomic development’’ (p. 11).
SURs are spread across the territories of Argentina and Mexico and are also by no means
confined to destitute areas where patronage structures are endemic. While non-patrimonial
structures make it almost impossible for local autocrats to centralize authority and
subsequently to cordon off their jurisdiction from outside attacks, such SURs continue to
exist if presidents lack the power to co-opt them.
It is with regard to her book’s main critique of scholarship which emphasizes the
importance of conditions intrinsic to authoritarian enclaves for SURs continuity that
Giraudy’s argument is most problematic. While SURs reproduction from above may indeed
be the result of a combination of institutional conditions found at different administrative
layers, it is difficult to see why cases of SURs self-reproduction should not depend on factors
exogenous to institutions.
Giraudy never clearly explains how relatively autonomous local autocrats establish party
cohesion and generate mass support. As Angelo Panebianco (1988, 20) showed, party
internal power dynamics are ‘‘strictly conditioned by the relations that the party establishes
in the genetic phases and after by its interactions with other organizations and societal
institutions.’’ For instance, the class in which a party is rooted may determine party’s
internal dynamics for decades. Working-class parties are more likely to develop strong
vertical structures under the control of a national party leadership than middle-class parties,
Panebianco showed. Consequently, working-class parties not only enjoy higher party
discipline but internal power structures are also often tilted in favor of national party
leaders. The point is that socioeconomic differences between and within countries may shape
power dynamics both between and within parties and therefore eventually the capacity of
relatively autonomous local autocrats to resist attacks from above. Characteristics intrinsic to
localities may also shape the ability of local autocrats to elicit mass support. While SURs
exist in jurisdictions with patrimonial and non-patrimonial structures in both Argentina and
Mexico, patrimonial structures increase the propensity of local autocrats to neutralize
presidential attacks and engage in SUR self-reproduction if presidential powers are weak,
Giraudy argued above. Since socioeconomic characteristics increase the probability that
patrimonial structures exist, the logic conclusion is that external factors must shape local
autocrats capacity of SUR self-reproduction. Finally, Giraudy’s argument that autocrats that
are able to elicit mass support are more likely to neutralize presidential attempts to oust
them from power also contradicts her claim that the roots of SURs continuity have all to do
with institutional context, not with factors intrinsic to localities. ‘‘To elicit political support
from the masses, subnational autocrats must implement policies and programs that are
popular among voters .... It does not matter whether SUR incumbents distribute public
goods programmatically among the local population or whether they dispense clientelistic
handouts. What is relevant is that incumbents in SURs are forced to deliver goods so as to
give citizens a vested interest in the perpetuation of the regime’’ (p. 31). However, ‘‘the
masses’’ are not a homogenous group but consist of different classes with different interests,
which have important consequences for the propensity of local politicians to elicit mass
support as a new book on Argentine local politics by Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro shows.
The starting point of Weitz-Shapiro’s Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty,
and Social Policy are, again, variances in undemocratic practices in Argentina’s local politics.
However, unlike Giraudy who is interested in explaining regime continuity, Weitz-Shapiro
wants to understand under what conditions local strongmen embark upon more democratic
forms of politics. Focusing on clientelism, one of many undemocratic practices in Argentine
local politics, she argues that engaging in such practices may not always be beneficial for
politicians. In jurisdictions in which political competition is high and where there is a
sizeable middle class, engaging in clientelism will have ‘‘audience costs’’ that outweigh the
benefits to engage in such practices.
Weitz-Shapiro argues that middle-class voters condemn clientelism because they see it as
an indicator for the poor quality of government service delivery more broadly. Service
delivery motivated by clientelism may not only distort the welfare of this group but
clientelism also usually requires politicians to spend most of their time in personal
interactions with voters rather than spending their time on public policy programs. The
opportunity costs this personalization of politics creates for middle-class voters is the reason
for why they reject clientelism. In addition, middle-class voters may reject clientelism on
moral grounds. Overall, Weitz-Shapiro’s assumption is that middle-class voters have fewer incentives to support clientelism and that they will use elections to punish politicians
engaging in such practices.
The findings presented by Weitz-Shapiro suggest that Schumpeterian views of democracy,
which claim that increasing competition will curb clientelism, are at best incomplete. Intense
competition among electoral candidates alone is insufficient to reduce the individualized
exchange of goods for political support. In fact, if poor voters comprise the majority of the
local electorate, an intensification of political competition may actually increase clientelist
practices. Likewise, the argument put forward by Weitz-Shapiro also challenges modernization
theory’s main claim that the more well to do a nation, the greater the chances it will
sustain a democracy. If politicians are relatively insulated from the electorate due to a lack of
electoral competition, middle-class voters will not be able to exert pressure on politicians to
opt out of clientelism. In short, a growing middle class steers politicians in more democratic
direction only in combination with political competition.
To explain why the reliance on clientelistic practices by politicians varies across
Argentina’s municipalities, Weitz-Shapiro examines the country’s largest Food Security
Policy, the Programa Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria (PNSA), which distributes food
boxes to destitute citizens. Based on an original survey about such practices conducted in
125 municipalities, Weitz-Shapiro finds that citizen–politician engagement varies across
Argentina because ‘‘politicians’ decision about whether to use clientelism reflect the
practices’ relative electoral costs and incumbents’ perceived security in office at a given point
in time’’ (p. 107).
Weitz-Shapiro’s book is an important contribution to the study of subnational politics
because the potential costs clientelism may have for politicians are rarely analyzed. Most
studies on local politics focus on the benefits such practices yield for politicians. More
important, her findings challenge theories which say that institutional characteristics
determine clientelist practices. Argentina’s federal system does not allow for ‘‘substantial
subnational institutional experimentation’’ (p. 15), yet, despite this relative institutional
homogeneity, levels of clientelism vary across the country. Likewise, Weitz-Shapiro also
argues against theories put forward by neoliberal scholars that have linked the prevalence of
clientelism to the size of the state in the (local) economy. Her data do not reveal any link
between control of the local economy by the state and the prevalence of clientelistic
practices. Finally, Weitz-Shapiro also criticizes neo-Tocquevillian perspectives that see
political accountability as a function of ‘‘strong’’ civil society engagement in politics. Based
on her empirical data, the author argues that the presence of strong horizontal links in
society without political competition among politicians is unlikely to lead toward more
accountability.
However, while Weitz-Shapiro shows that electoral support in competitive political
systems depends on social structure and that not all voters have the same incentives to
support local autocrats, thereby exposing the simplistic understanding of ‘‘mass support’’
put forward in Giraudy’s argument on SURs self-reproduction, it would have been
interesting to hear more about what factors determine levels of political competition in
Argentine municipalities. While Weitz-Shapiro goes to great length to show that clientelism
does not influence levels of political competition (but rather, competition in combination
with relatively affluent voters influences clientelism), she does not put forward any argument
as to what determines competition in the first place. Arguably, the competition between
politicians or the absence thereof, has its roots in structural factors including local economic
conditions and the opportunities they present to local elites for accumulating and monopolizing resources.2 Likewise, structural conditions may shape the independence of the
electorate vis-a`-vis politicians and therefore their willingness to punish them at the ballot
box. Most important, Weitz-Shapiro’s main premise, namely that middle-class voters reject
clientelistic practices for moral and economic reasons, sits oddly with existing works that
showed that it is not so much the presence of middle-class voters that matters but their
position vis-a`-vis the government and political elites that determines whether they push for
democracy or not. For instance, Weitz-Shapiro does not discuss Barrington Moore’s classic
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy that showed how in many countries different
modes of development created middle classes that depend on the state and became
authoritarian deadweights rather than a bulwark for democracy as a consequence.3 Likewise,
socioeconomic development may not only influence the position of middle-class voters visa`-vis
the state but also shape the relationship of less affluent voters to the state. The
‘‘economic autonomy’’ of voters, poor or rich, determines whether politicians have anything
to gain politically from engaging in clientelism and therefore whether they engage in such
practices in the first place, as recent studies have shown.4
Even if one were to disregard such studies that emphasize the importance of structural
factors in creating different electorates and eventually the propensity of different electorates
to shun or engage in clientelistic practices, Weitz-Shapiro’s theory takes the composition of
the local electorate as a given. Numerous studies in recent years have shown, however, that
clientelism in itself shapes the composition of the electorate. The Curley-effect in Boston,
where four-time mayor James Michael Curley actively shaped the electorate in his favor by
channeling resources to poor Irish voters and thereby triggering an exodus of richer citizens
from the city is only the most infamous example.5
Overall, institution-centric theories of local authoritarianism ought to develop a more
sophisticated concept of ‘‘local conditions,’’ especially if they want to rule them out as
explanatory factors. While absolute levels of poverty or ‘‘local cultures’’ (however defined)
may indeed fail to explain the variance in SURs continuity both between and within
countries, class formation and the political dynamics that ensue from it ought to at least
complement institutional approaches to the study of SURs. While studies such as WeitzShapiro’s
book are a step in the right direction, they too could make a better use of the rich
literature on how structural conditions exogenous to local institutions shape local political
machines and the clientelistic practices on which their survival depends.
References
Gibson, Edward. 2012. Boundary control: Subnational authoritarianism in federal democracies.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Andrei Shleifer. 2005. The Curley effect: The economics of shaping
the electorate. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization: 1–19.
Hale, Henry E. 2003. Explaining machine politics in Russia’s regions: Economy, ethnicity,
and legacy. Post-Soviet Affairs 19 (3): 228–263.
McMann, Kelly M. 2006. Economic autonomy and democracy: hybrid regimes in Russia and
Kyrgyzstan. Cambridge University Press.
Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. Political parties: Organization and power. London and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Rodan, Garry and Caroline Hughes. 2014. The politics of accountability in Southeast Asia: the
dominance of moral ideologies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Notes
1 Gibson’s (2012) book was reviewed by Michael Buehler in Publius (Spring 2014) 44 (2).
2 See, for instance, Hale (2003) on how the ethnic and economic legacies of the Soviet
Union shaped possibilities for machine politics in Russia’s regions after 1991.
3 Weitz-Shapiro mentions Barrington Moore in a single footnote on p. 4 and places him
in the same category with modernization theorists such as Seymour Martin Lipset.
4 McMann (2006).
5 See Glaeser and Shleifer (2005), for an analysis of the Curley effect.
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